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Abstract 
Political decision-making in the Euro-crisis has relied heavily on executive discretion, 
exercised at speed and rationalised with reference to the pressing demands of emergency.  
This paper explores the challenges raised for political opposition, notably challenges of a 
temporal kind.  With its deviations from policy and procedural norms, discretionary politics 
tends towards a politics without rhythm, leading to major asymmetries between decision-
makers and voices of opposition.  These centre on issues of timing and the ability to identify 
authorship and content of decisions. Such asymmetries arguably correspond to an underlying 
one between the temporality of political decision-making and of contemporary finance 
capitalism, with agents of the former increasingly inclined to pursue ‘fast policy’ as a means 
to keep pace.  A democratic response is likely to involve strengthening and synchronising the 
rhythms of parliamentary politics, as well as being receptive to forms of opposition less 
reliant on the rhythms that discretion subverts. 
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Politicizing Europe:  
The Challenge of Executive Discretion 
 
Introduction 
Modern political authority tends to be considered legitimate to the extent it 
can be openly and consequentially disputed.  This is one reason why the 
prospects for the organised contestation of decision-making have been a 
recurrent theme of scholarship on the European Union (EU).  Insofar as these 
prospects are weak, as much work on the ‘democratic deficit’ suggests, the EU 
seems anomalous, at least by the measure of our political ideals.  As today’s 
Union undergoes rapid reshaping, it is worth asking how far the outlook is 
changing.  Are we seeing the emergence of new channels of opposition that 
could strengthen the contestation of EU decision-making – the emergence of a 
more ‘politicized’ order, as it is sometimes called?  Or are the obstacles to 
such opposition proliferating, such that politicizing Europe, rather than a 
process in train, becomes an increasingly demanding challenge?  In this paper 
I show how the irregular forms of decision-making the Euro crisis has 
occasioned are posing new questions of the temporal framework by which 
decisions in a democracy are contested. Modern democratic politics has 
typically been a politics of rhythm.  As political improvisation comes to the 
fore, so the rhythms of democratic politics are put under strain.  How political 
contestation might be achieved under these conditions will be one of our 
guiding questions.  
A useful way to characterise the political handling of the Euro crisis is to 
speak of decision-making of a discretionary kind.  By this I refer to measures 
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which exceed established rules and norms, either in the sense that these are 
deliberately set aside, or in the sense that they are necessarily transcended 
because they weakly cover the situation at hand.  These rules and norms may 
be codified or tacit, and may concern the substance of particular policy 
regimes or the mechanisms by which decisions are arrived at.1  Examples of 
discretionary decision-making in this period include the series of ad hoc 
measures used to restore market stability from 2010 onwards (the European 
Financial Stability Facility, the European Stability Mechanism, aid packages to 
particular countries, and the Fiscal Compact) as well as the procedural 
improvisations that have facilitated these (notably the concentration of 
decision-making in the European Council, and the expanding role of the 
European Central Bank (ECB)).   Unconventional moves of this kind have 
been rationalised as necessary adaptations to the pressures of crisis – 
exceptional times demanding exceptional measures.  ‘Emergency politics’ of 
this kind has been the stand-out feature of the crisis response so far (White, 
forthcoming). 
Discretionary decision-making is not without its merits.  If a particular set of 
rules is wrong-headed, setting them aside may have much to commend it.  If 
unforeseen situations arise, there may be few rules to refer to.  More 
generally, even in the well-designed polity, an element of discretion vis-à-vis 
rules and norms may be ineradicable.  Accompanied by a considered 
weighing of options, one might sometimes wish to applaud the exercise of 
discretion as the exercise of judgement, particularly when made evaluable 
through a public debate in which justifications are advanced.  And with its 
reflexive attitude towards routinized practice, one might see it as a welcome 
                                                        
1 An extended treatment of the concept of ‘discretion’ would need to pursue these distinctions 
systematically; for the purposes of the present discussion, these varieties of discretion can be 
considered as one.  I note in passing that, particularly in the international setting where the reach 
of existing rules and norms may be disputed, the extent to which actors are choosing to exercise 
discretion or cannot but do so may be contentious.  
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reminder of the revisability of our political commitments – an invitation to 
question standard ways of doing things and to retain a sense of political 
possibility.   
But whatever its possible appeal, and whether pursued in good faith or bad, 
discretionary decision-making raises major problems for political 
contestation.2  More specifically, it does so when exercised not in forums of 
public debate such as legislatures, where public contestation is structurally 
encouraged, but by governments and administrative bodies acting with 
relative autonomy.3  As I shall argue, executive-led discretion generates sharp 
asymmetries between decision-makers on the one hand and those who would 
scrutinise them on the other.  Many of these have a temporal quality.  
Discretionary politics tends towards a politics without rhythm, in which those 
who would contest decision-making are perpetually liable to be left harried, 
disorganised, and caught by surprise.  Something of this kind is visible in 
Europe today, and to the extent that EU decision-making is still marked by 
rhythms, these intersect only sporadically with the rhythms of parliamentary 
politics (be it those of the electoral cycle or of legislative scrutiny) and, given 
the plurality of political systems that compose the EU, these latter intersect 
only sporadically with one another.  This lack of synchrony weakens political 
opposition, and allows it to be easily cast as voicing parochial grievances 
rather than principled critique of generalisable significance.   
One may be tempted to see these as temporary problems, characteristic of the 
EU in an exceptional period in which the old frameworks are being replaced 
by the new.  That a more predictable, rule-bound order is under construction 
seems to be the hope of many, including some of the institutional actors of the 
                                                        
2 It also raises major questions for the rule of law, though these are not our focus here: see 
Dyzenhaus 2006; Scheuerman 2004.   
3 I will not discuss judicial discretion: for one account focused on the European Court of Justice, 
see Lindseth 2010, Chapter 4. 
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EU itself (Commission 2012: 13).4  But there are various reasons to be 
sceptical.  One is that the specifics of the new order under construction seem 
to leave many opportunities available for the exercise of discretion 
(Menéndez 2013; cf. Scharpf 2014).  Another is that discretionary decision-
making has an established place in the history of European integration.  
Notwithstanding that this process is often narrated as one of rule-formation 
and ever greater constraints on government autonomy, the emergence of the 
EU coincides with the increasing independence of administrative actors from 
the traditional organs of democratic control (Müller 2012) – indeed, it is 
sometimes said to be symptomatic thereof (Lindseth 2010).5  More widely still, 
executive discretion is arguably an increasingly prominent feature of western 
politics more generally (Scheuerman 2004; Ackerman 2010).  It is widespread 
in North America as much as the EU.  Any renewal of the possibilities for 
political contestation would seem to require more than simply the patience to 
outlive the Euro crisis.  As I shall suggest in conclusion, an effective response 
is likely to involve seeking to strengthen and synchronise the rhythms of 
parliamentary politics, as well as being receptive to forms of political 
opposition emerging from civil society which are less reliant on the rhythms 
that discretionary decision-making subverts. 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 However appealing a discretionary regime may be to national governments, they too have 
reason to seek a more rule-based order insofar as this makes the exercise of power a little less 
brazen, a little more anonymous.  
5 Lindseth offers a useful historical account of rising executive power in the EU as reflecting a 
wider ‘post-war constitutional settlement of administrative governance’ evolving at the national 
level first and foremost.  I am less convinced than Lindseth that this settlement was normatively 
well-grounded.  Note also that the rise of executive power is not identical to the rise of executive 
discretion. 
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Asymmetries of a Politics without Rhythm 
Let us begin with some general reflections about the relationship between 
political contestation, time, and discretionary politics.  It has been observed 
that representative democracy as we know it relies on a minimum of 
periodicity (e.g. Linz 1998; Chesneaux 2000: 409-10).  We see this in a range of 
institutional devices.  Parliamentary timetables offer the possibility for 
ordered and well-prepared debates on new legislation and the recurrent 
interrogation of ministers.  Electoral cycles express the capacity of citizens to 
cast judgement on their representatives at regular intervals and revise their 
political priorities.  Fixed or pre-announced election dates allow political 
parties to organise campaigns and the media to analyse their manifestos.  
These temporal patterns introduce predictability into politics, and ensure that 
decisions can be both contested and revisited.  Often the pulse of these events 
stretches out over weeks, months or years, as though meaningful deliberation 
and debate requires not only regularity but an unhurried pace (Wolin 1997).  
In one form or another, representative democracy has been closely associated 
with rhythm.6 
Discretionary politics by contrast, understood as decision-makers’ willingness 
to act independently of rules and norms, in its pure form is likely to be a 
politics without rhythm.  Decisions which are unconstrained in this way will 
generally resist being located in an identifiable temporal pattern.  I say 
generally because traces of periodicity may persist due to the influence of non-
institutional rhythms: where there are sharply defined business cycles, for 
instance, or cycles associated with the natural world (e.g. climatic), these may 
exercise their own structuring effect.  But because such rhythms are plural, 
and a human choice concerning which to prioritise at a given moment will 
                                                        
6 On the concept of rhythm and its wider application in the social sciences, see Young and 
Schuller 1988, pp.13ff. 
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always be needed, they do not promise anything like the same degree of 
predictability.  In the absence of institutions able to impose rhythms, the 
intervals of politics will tend to become irregular and uncertain.  Though 
generalisations are inherently difficult, one can imagine a discretion-based 
political model will typically display such features as snap decisions, arbitrary 
ultimatums, indefinite mandates, and policy regimes of unknown duration.   
There are several respects in which the possibilities for political contestation 
are attenuated when decision-making decouples itself from the rhythms of 
representative democracy.   Such a condition entails significant asymmetries 
between those taking decisions on the one hand (e.g. executives and 
administrative agencies) and voices of opposition on the other (e.g. parties in 
the legislature, or movements and individuals in civil society).7  First, 
oppositions are at a significant disadvantage in terms of initiative.  The power 
of timing is an important one in politics (Schedler and Santiso 1998), yet one 
that institutionalised rhythms go some way to neutralizing.  In the absence of 
such rhythms, those who lack the power of timing will find themselves 
recurrently taken by surprise and forced to react to initiatives post hoc.  
Observers note that executives enjoy a ‘first-mover advantage’ even in 
relatively rule-bound political orders (Ackerman 2010: 40): that advantage 
increases insofar as other organs of state and society lack predictable rhythms 
around which to organise themselves and shape decision-making.   
Second, oppositions will be at a disadvantage in terms of their ability to set 
the tempo of events.  Discretionary decision-making is likely to be fast-paced 
(executive discretion being preferred often precisely for its speed), with the 
effect that oppositions will find themselves forced to act quickly.  In the 
absence of binding procedures, they will lack the ability to alleviate whatever 
                                                        
7 This holds particularly in a context where citizens have been socialized to expect these rhythms. 
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time pressures are placed on them by appeal to a standardised timetable.8 
And if acting quickly is the condition of having influence at all, in seeking to 
accelerate their activities they may sacrifice the very virtues of debate and 
deliberation for which their participation might be welcomed (Scheuerman 
2004).   
Third, to the extent that policy-making departs from the typical forms of 
representative democracy, it may be difficult to establish what kinds of 
decision are being taken, and hence what kind of opposition is appropriate.  
Knowledge of the policy essentials will be sharply imbalanced.  It may be 
difficult, for instance, to distinguish initiatives intended to create merely 
temporary arrangements from those intended to forge permanent ones.  What 
counts as an exception to an enduring norm, and what counts as a new 
beginning, may be ambiguous.  If the time horizons associated with a 
particular proposal are uncertain, as an abbreviated process of scrutiny may 
dictate, it will be unclear whether to contest that policy or tolerate it.  This 
ambiguity may in turn make it difficult to generate public and media interest, 
even where long-term implications are suspected.  Who is responsible for 
decisions may also become harder to establish the more they are taken 
unconventionally and unpredictably.  Again, it becomes difficult for critical 
actors to know where to focus their efforts.     
Fourth, not only the practicalities of opposition but its legitimacy may be 
compromised in the context of a discretion-based regime.  Where no regular 
temporal slots have been reserved for it, opposition may come to seem 
decadent – a brake on effective and efficient decision-making.  The rhetoric of 
emergency is easily deployed to this effect once the possibility of breaking or 
                                                        
8 Sometimes they will also face the opposite problem: that of resisting the delaying tactics of 
decision-makers, and of finding opportune moments to contest and raise public awareness of 
‘non-decisions’.  I leave these possibilities aside here, but they should be regarded as significant 
parallel phenomena, underplayed by proponents of the ‘social acceleration’ thesis discussed 
below. 
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suspending the rhythms of representative democracy has been established, 
and when pressing external pressures that demand quick response can be 
cited.  Opposition voices may find it correspondingly more difficult to assert 
their right to be heard.  Where decision-makers do seek a dose of public 
legitimacy, it may well take plebiscitary form, with a direct appeal to ‘public 
opinion’ that bypasses political parties and other mechanisms of organised 
deliberation, with polling timed such that the figures are favourable.9 
As these brief general reflections indicate, discretionary decision-making, as a 
politics without rhythm, engenders asymmetries likely to weaken 
contestation.  Opposition is likely to take the form of reactive and abbreviated 
dissent, weak in its effectiveness and questioned in its legitimacy.  One need 
scarcely add that in such circumstances strong opposition may be more 
necessary than ever, since decision-making which is pursued in irregular 
fashion may very well be of poor quality and a worthy target of contestation.  
It risks being capricious, weakly informed by the systematic consideration of 
alternatives, and weakly supported by public justification.  That these 
irregular methods may in many cases be used precisely to pursue policies 
marking a sharp rupture with the status quo further raises the stakes and 
adds to the burdens of scrutiny facing opposition actors. 
Whether contemporary Europe in the age of the Euro crisis has reached 
anything approaching this condition is the topic of the next section.  It is 
worth highlighting before continuing though that wider tendencies towards 
this condition have been noted by a number of scholars of western politics.  
The de-structuring of the rhythms of representative democracy are evident, in 
one author’s words, in the way ‘liberal democratic lawmaking increasingly 
consists of vague and open-ended legal resolutions, exceptional and 
emergency norms delegating vast discretionary power to the executive and 
                                                        
9 On ‘poll-government’, see Chesneaux 2000: 409. 
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various administrative bodies, and poorly crafted statutes possessing a 
limited half-life’ (Scheuerman 2004: 56).  Emphasizing particularly the 
implications of discretionary decision-making for the rule of law, the same 
author describes the weakening of ‘a commitment to general, clear, relatively 
stable, prospective general rules’ (Scheuerman 2004: xvii) and moves away 
from legal stability or evolution towards serial ruptures and ad hoc fixes (cf. 
Ackerman 2010).10 
Importantly, many such arguments see these tendencies as symptomatic of a 
deeper asymmetry between political institutions and the market economy.  If 
representative democracy struggles to maintain its rhythms, in this view it is 
because increasingly it is subject to the uncertainty and high-speed change 
associated with other social systems, notably contemporary financial 
capitalism (Scheuerman 2004; Rosa 2003, 2013; Wolin 1997; McIvor 2011).  
Jessop speaks in this context of ‘the state’s loss of time sovereignty’ (Jessop 
2009: 154), as decision-makers are forced to contend with such nebulous and 
volatile phenomena as investor confidence, which fluctuate unpredictably 
and resist responses based on stable rules and regularized procedures, and 
which also raise the stakes of decision-making sufficiently high that the 
automatic application of pre-set rules could have unacceptably negative 
repercussions (cf. familiar notions of banks ‘too big to fail’).  Decision-makers 
would then seem to have two options: either to abdicate responsibility for 
regulating the market economy (as libertarians would prescribe), or – 
particularly when a crisis suggests such an approach is inadequate – to 
reassert themselves, not through the conventional (slow, rhythmic) channels 
of representative democracy but by means of ‘fast policy’ (Jessop 2009) made 
                                                        
10 For an interesting effort to find the positive in these developments, see Posner and Vermeule 
2011.  Their emphasis on the potential for political rather than legal constraints on executive 
power is promising: their suggestion that plebiscitary mechanisms backed by media commentary 
are adequate to this task, and indeed largely perform it, seems complacent however. 
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by relatively autonomous executives and functional agencies, designed to 
respond quickly to fast-moving and unpredictable events. 
One should be cautious with the determinist implications of these arguments 
from ‘social acceleration’.  They are nonetheless a useful reminder that the 
exercise of executive discretion is by no means necessarily indicative of 
unlimited executive power.  Whatever their position of strength vis-à-vis 
voices of political opposition, executives themselves may be constrained by 
conditions outside their control, and encouraged in their adoption of 
discretionary measures by powerful organized interests.11 
 
Europe’s Fragmented Dissent 
Does the Europe of the Euro crisis display the hallmarks of a politics without 
rhythm?  In its pure form, evidently not.  The member states of the EU retain 
the electoral cycles  characteristic of representative democracy, supplemented 
by that of the European Parliament, while some of the institutions peculiar to 
the EU – notably the Commission – have their own rhythms of appointment 
as well as timetables of decision-making.12  Nor has any of these institutions 
been wholly excluded from the handling of the crisis: each, if only formally, 
has exercised certain powers.   
However, it does seem accurate to suggest the key moments of decision-
making in recent years have been markedly unpredictable and irregular.  One 
sees this expressed in the preponderance of heads-of-government meetings 
outside the EU framework, that is, ungoverned by procedural timetables, as 
well as in the prominence of the executive-composed European Council as the 
                                                        
11 In a large, polycentric polity such as the EU, executive power is further compromised by long 
chains of bureaucratic command separating decision from implementation. 
12 On some such rhythms of EU administration, see Ekengren 2002. 
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EU’s pre-eminent decision-making forum, in place of a model by which it ‘co-
decides’ with the Parliament (Dawson and de Witte 2013).  One also observes 
it, more impressionistically, in specific decision-making sequences producing 
outcomes largely unpredicted at the time –  for example the fall of the 
Berlusconi government in autumn 2011 under pressure from the European 
Council in general and certain members in particular (acting in turn partly 
under pressure from the bond markets).  Such irregular forms of decision-
making generate many of the asymmetries for opposition previously 
described.  The persisting rhythms of representative democracy, such that 
they are, have tended to intersect weakly with the key moments of decision-
making.  Only briefly, for instance, have legislatures been able to debate the 
merits of particular initiatives, their timetables compressed and distorted.  
Only occasionally has an election coincided with a major step in the crisis 
response such that decision-making could be meaningfully contested.   The 
usual rhythms of democratic politics have thus been relevant to the course of 
events only sporadically – and indeed sometimes appear deliberately 
marginalized.  Furthermore, the legitimacy of parliamentary dissent has also 
frequently been queried through the use of emergency rhetoric (White, 
forthcoming).  The possibilities for political contestation have been 
correspondingly limited.13 
One sees the subversion of these rhythms in the suddenness with which 
legislatures are presented with detailed policy measures to scrutinize and the 
speed with which they are required to conclude deliberation.  Repeatedly one 
sees national executives, in the name of decisive action to confront market 
pressure, coordinating in informal settings to produce deals requiring 
                                                        
13 Not all these developments post-date the Euro crisis: concerns about ‘deparliamentarisation’ 
are new neither in the field of EU research nor comparative politics more generally (see e.g. 
Weiler 1999: 266; Curtin 2009). 
Politicizing Europe: The Challenge of Executive Discretion 
  16
approval to an early deadline.14  The EU-sponsored austerity measures 
advanced by Mario Monti’s Italian government in late 2011 conform to the 
‘fast policy’ model, with sharp policy shifts drawn up in response to high 
borrowing costs, and parliamentarians pressured to approve the measures at 
speed.  Approval or a full-scale effort to bring down the government have 
often appeared to be the only options left before the national legislature 
(Dawson and de Witte 2013; cf. Scharpf 2014).  Transnational aid packages 
have produced similar pressures in both the contributing and receiving 
countries: not untypical was when the German Bundestag in late November 
2012 was given less than 48 hours to approve a financial aid package for 
Greece agreed by Eurozone finance ministers and the IMF.15  As well as 
curtailing the time available for meaningful scrutiny and deliberation, these 
moves encourage complaints about procedure which threaten further to 
crowd out discussion of substance.   
The EU is often pictured as the paradigmatic slow organisation, in which 
decisions are reached sluggishly or not at all.16  In this period of crisis we see 
the capacity of its key institutions to move quickly.  Yet one risks an equally 
one-sided account if one dwells purely on speed.  Irregularity is the key 
observation: action proceeding in fits and starts, with accelerated ratification 
processes following sometimes quite extended periods of intergovernmental 
negotiation.  Certainly, one should be careful not to see legislatures as mere 
victims: they too may successfully be able to play discretionary ‘time games’ 
with other institutions (Goetz 2009).  But to the extent that they do so, one can 
                                                        
14 On ‘deadlinification’ as a broader feature of EU rule, see Ekengren 2002: 128.  On the 
phenomenon of intergovernmental ‘breakfast meetings’: Puetter 2012. 
15 Executive agreement was reached on Tuesday 27 November 2012; the Bundestag was expected 
to vote on it by Friday 30th.  Several parliamentarians objected, and the Left Party for the same 
reason voted against.  That the package was no mere technical measure but raised wider 
normative questions is suggested by the fact it was opposed also from the Greek side by Syriza.  
16 Drawing on the stereotype, see The Economist, ‘The Sleepwalkers’, 25 May 2013. 
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expect them to come to look less like deliberative chambers that contest public 
policy and more like corporate actors pursuing institutional interests. 
The reduced relevance of the rhythms of representative democracy can be 
seen also in electoral politics.  That there can be no guarantee a general 
election falls at a critical juncture in a polity’s existence is of course one of the 
wider short-comings of representative democracy.  The lack of opportunity 
for European Parliamentary elections directly to impinge on the Euro crisis 
before mid-2014 is in many ways simply bad luck – though it is noteworthy 
that the other EU institutions have felt entitled to press ahead with 
fundamental changes to the EU’s make-up irrespective of this.  What is less 
down to misfortune is the timing of key decisions by governments so as to 
avoid electoral repercussions where possible.  Announcements concerning 
austerity measures – one of the main pillars of Europe’s crisis response – have 
frequently been postponed until after national elections, such that their scale 
and the details of their effects are absent from electoral debates.  The 
phenomenon of out-of-cycle budgetary announcements, issued when they are 
least likely to be strongly contested (i.e. just after an election), has been 
evident in several member-states.  One might describe this as ‘rhythm 
management’17 – an expression of the wider power of timing and initiative 
enjoyed by executives.18 
Note also the phenomenon of new policy regimes of uncertain duration, 
which further complicate the task of political opposition.  The extent to which 
the ECB’s policy (since September 2012) of buying the bonds of indebted 
Eurozone member states is a long-term innovation or a short-term measure is 
                                                        
17 The manipulation of rhythm is at least as problematic as its absence, as it can allow misleading 
expectations about influence to be maintained. 
18 At the EU level, the scope for executive powers to use timing as a resource is somewhat 
constrained by their need to coordinate with one another.  Still, one can expect member-state 
governments to accommodate each others’ timing concerns where possible, and these external 
constraints, such that they are, can in turn be a convenient justification for side-stepping 
legislative rhythms and seizing ‘windows of opportunity’ when they arise (cf. Ekengren 2002).   
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unclear, as is the more general role of the ECB in the future of Eurozone 
administration (cf. Schelkle 2014).19  If the status of a policy regime, its 
timetable of reappraisal, and the role of its initiator is unclear, strategies of 
response are correspondingly hard to formulate. 
Some of these discrepancies between decision-making and the temporality of 
political contestation can be put down to a period of exceptional discretion as 
Europe comes to terms with its crisis.  While this might very well be 
normatively problematic nonetheless, it could at least be regarded as an 
interim condition, before a more structured political order anchored in the 
existing EU institutions emerges.  We have already noted the possibility that 
whatever new order emerges in the coming years may be as susceptible as 
that preceding it to discretionary handling where it suits powerful actors.  
Even if we discount this possibility however, it is worth noting that the new 
rhythms of decision-making which seem poised to develop – those of the 
European Semester, for instance – do not correlate in any systematic way with 
the rhythms of democratic politics as they stand today.  If, as it is proposed, 
the Commission is to scrutinize and make demands of national budgets on an 
annual basis, it is difficult to see how parliamentary elections spaced out over 
a much wider period will have influence on the process, except on an 
occasional and arbitrary basis.20  Even legislative politics – both at European 
or national level – would need to make significant adaptations to coalesce 
with these rhythms.  In other words, while EU decision-making may 
                                                        
19 Note also that the policy as announced in August 2012 – the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) scheme – and as implemented in the months following diverge in important respects, 
chiefly to do with conditionality requirements, leaving uncertainty as to what the policy actually 
involves.  (This was clearly visible when the Bundesgericht examined the legality of the policy in 
June 2013: http://euobserver.com/economic/120465.) 
20 In an interesting discussion of EU temporality, Goetz asks ‘how does the EU tick?’ (Goetz 2009).  
Perhaps such a formulation already underestimates the discretionary aspects of European 
executive decision-making however, particularly in the Council and in extra-EU ad hoc forums, 
where the regular rhythm of a ticking clock is hard to identify, while the rhythms of other 
institutions are often peripheral to decision-making. 
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conceivably become more regularized, there is no reason to expect it to 
synchronize better with the rhythms of democratic politics.   
It is furthermore the case that Europe’s democratic rhythms exist in the plural 
and lack synchrony with one another.  Each EU member-state operates to a 
different electoral timetable and is shaped by different cadences of legislative 
scrutiny.  Goetz emphasizes the heterotemporality of EU politics, that is, the 
absence of a dominant political cycle (Goetz 2009).  The effect for political 
contestation is that the forces of opposition are divided across different ‘time-
zones’.  Although debates in the public spheres of EU member-states may to 
some degree parallel one another, even respond to one another (cf. Kriesi and 
Grande 2014), the timing of their institutionalized expression is splintered. 
It may be tempting to see this as desirable.  The fact that somewhere in the 
EU, in one member state or another, there is always an election around the 
corner might be thought to exercise a useful constraint on the decisions of the 
Council, ensuring that critical voices of public opinion are never wholly 
discounted from its considerations.  It might also be thought a possible source 
of mobilization: as revolutionary movements around the world have shown 
over the last few decades, when opposition is successfully marshalled in one 
country it can build momentum in others, leading to the famous ‘domino 
effect’.  Opposition which is cumulative rather than instantaneous would 
seem to have something going for it. 
These cross-cutting temporal divisions are more likely a weakness however.  
First, such fragmented oppositions may be less effective.  They will struggle 
to impose a rhythm onto decision-makers disposed towards discretionary 
action, since they have no single rhythm of their own to offer.  Second, that 
they are localized in this way makes them prone to being cast as parochial.  
The non-synchronisation of political opposition in Europe contributes to the 
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‘nationalization’ of the crisis, whereby those resisting austerity measures tend 
to be portrayed as responding to local concerns, perhaps defending local 
interests –  for example those of a ‘debtor country’ – rather than voicing 
principled critiques in the name of a common European interest.  While we 
tend to think of this as a problem of the absence of genuinely transnational 
political actors such as pan-European parties, it can equally be seen as a 
problem of non-coordination between national actors, due to their anchoring 
in different institutional rhythms.  Spatial fragmentation accompanies 
temporal fragmentation.  Herein lies one of the shortcomings of suggestions 
that Europe’s national institutions in broadly their current form can be 
adequate sites for the political contestation of EU decision-making.21 
The argument is frequently made that the Euro crisis is already leading to the 
EU’s politicization (De Wilde and Zürn 2012).  If politicization here means no 
more than the salience in public discourse of matters European and a measure 
of polarisation and conflict in their appraisal (cf. Kriesi and Grande 2014), the 
point may have validity – though one would still need to reckon with the 
likelihood that large numbers of EU citizens are oblivious or indifferent to 
these developments and that politicisation is therefore quite uneven in its 
reach (Hurrelmann, Gora and Wagner 2013; White 2010, 2011).  Any 
normatively appealing concept of politicization surely needs however to go 
beyond the mere fact of division to consider how far it is shaped by claims 
made in the name of Europe as a whole.  Conflicts which pit territorial sub-
units of the EU against one another – in the idiom of the crisis, debtor states 
against creditor states – lead to decision-making being contested only on the 
question of whose parochial interests it serves, not on the deeper questions of 
principle that may be at stake (e.g. how interests should be defined and 
                                                        
21 On the potential of national parliaments, see Cooper 2012.    
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weighed).  Oppositions which are temporally fragmented fit all too easily into 
this nation-shaped mould. 
 
Timing Opposition 
Discretionary forms of rule seem to raise particular challenges then for the 
ability of dissenting voices to contest the substance of EU decision-making.  
Moments of decision-making become irregular and unpredictable, leaving 
opposition at a significant disadvantage.  Though the rhythms characteristic 
of representative democracy do not disappear, they are marginalized, 
disrupted and squeezed, and lack synchrony with one another, leaving 
political oppositions weak and fragmented.  It is, moreover, by no means clear 
that this is a temporary condition: nothing about the way the EU is being 
transformed suggests this, and the tendencies may in any case be global ones.  
This should be a source of unease even for those who endorse the decisions 
produced in this way: weak opposition undermines legitimacy and raises the 
prospect of non-compliance.  As Peter Mair famously noted, ‘once we cannot 
organize opposition in the EU, we are then almost forced to organize 
opposition to the EU’ (Mair 2007: 7). 
While executive discretion is by no means the only challenge facing political 
contestation in today’s EU – problems of ideological hegemony and citizen 
disenchantment may be just as central – it is worth considering how political 
opposition might evolve to contend with it.  Based on the foregoing analysis, 
one will naturally look first to the possibilities for enhancing the EU’s political 
rhythms.   In part this might involve efforts to make executive decision-
making more rule-bound and predictable by strengthening the constraints 
within which it must operate – essentially a rule-of-law project.  In part it 
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might involve efforts to harmonize and strengthen the EU’s rhythms of 
opposition. If the political will to support them were available, one might 
point to a number of institutional ‘solutions’.  Holding the national elections 
of member states on the same day would seem one way to advance the 
synchronisation of opposition, and would entail only a marginal loss of 
decision-making authority at the national level: existing processes would be 
largely preserved.  National referenda could be likewise synchronized, 
notwithstanding the fact not all member states are likely to submit future 
decisions on European integration to a popular vote.  Perhaps there is more 
scope for coordination at the party-political level, since this is feasible within 
current institutional arrangements.  National parties might decide to 
synchronize certain policy statements, enhancing the media attention they 
receive, or call for parallel debates in national parliaments.  And one might 
still look for ways of strengthening the European Parliament, such that its 
rhythms of election and debate can better impose themselves on decision-
making.  Increasing its powers vis-à-vis the Council, even embedding the 
latter within it, has much to commend it in principle.  More modestly, one 
might simply seek ways to integrate Parliamentary time with the emerging 
rhythms of the European Semester, such that debates in the legislature can 
have influence on the latter – or such that it can be more readily observed if 
they do not.22 
Moves to strengthen the rhythms of representative democracy do not 
however address the fact that these rhythms always risk marginalisation.  It is 
one of the basic limitations of legislatures in their current form that, being 
dependent on rhythms, they are vulnerable to the kind of ‘rhythm 
management’ earlier described, as well as to the time pressures that theorists 
                                                        
22 The Commission ‘Blueprint’ notes the desirability of flanking the European Semester timetable 
with two European Parliamentary debates (Commission 2012: 36), though it is unclear the extent 
to which meaningful contestation of decision-making is the goal. 
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of social acceleration describe.  It seems important therefore also to recognize 
forms of political opposition which are independent of such rhythms.23  Extra-
parliamentary movements in particular have the flexibility to time their 
actions so as better to respond to discretionary decision-making, and to do so 
in synchronized fashion.  The Euro crisis has seen a number of protests and 
strikes coordinated transnationally, in a way that amplifies their public 
visibility, if not ultimately their political effectiveness.24  Petitions likewise 
have the capacity to offer moments of synchronized opposition: this is one of 
the potential qualities of the European Citizens Initiative, whatever its other 
limitations.  The ICTs offer forms of coordinated politics that rival the 
economic domain in spontaneity and speed of action.  All these forms of 
opposition have an unpredictable and elastic quality that makes them well 
suited to responding to discretionary rule. 
If extra-parliamentary opposition is nonetheless too remote from decision-
making to be consistently influential, and too disorganized and spontaneous 
to be reliably deliberative, one might ask whether there are not ways of 
reconfiguring legislative institutions so as to incorporate some of the same 
elasticity.  How might one design non-rhythmic democratic institutions, so as 
better to contend with the discretionary manoeuvres of executives?  
Establishing the possibility of snap elections should a certain threshold of 
public support be crossed would be one approach.  Oddball proposals such as 
randomizing the timing of elections so they become less easy for executives to 
discount from their calculations would be another.  Certainly at a theoretical 
level it seems important to explore the possibility that democracy and rhythm 
should part company. 
                                                        
23 On the distinctive temporal logic of ‘agitation’: Wolin 2005; on the competing attractions of 
political routine and spontaneity: Goodin 1998: 48. 
24 See e.g. the coordinated strikes of 14 November 2012 in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, France, 
and Belgium, as reported in the New York Times (‘Workers Across Europe Synchronise Protests’, 
14 November 2012). 
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Aside from questions of realistic probability, such ideas might seem to leave 
the EU at risk of paralysis in times of genuine crisis.  Are there not 
circumstances when a decisive executive actor should be able to act with 
discretion, unencumbered by the whims of political opposition?  It may be 
possible to accept this while still looking for ways of placing constraints on 
the scope and duration of unconventional rule.  Requiring that the use of 
special powers face parliamentary review at regular intervals (perhaps over a 
period of just days or weeks), and meet ever higher thresholds of 
parliamentary support to be continued, may go some way to checking the 
exercise of discretion without erasing it (cf. Ackerman 2010).   
Coming to terms with discretionary decision-making is likely to require 
imaginative thinking.  As a preliminary step I hope to have indicated some of 
the challenges facing political opposition in today’s EU.  The rise of executive 
power, and with it the marginalization and compression of the rhythms of 
representative democracy, are neither wholly new tendencies nor ones unique 
to this setting.  The Euro crisis reveals them with some clarity however, and 
has the potential to exacerbate them in the long term.  Politicizing Europe in a 
way that enhances rather than detracts from the legitimacy of its decision-
making would seem to require the strengthening of its political opposition, 
either through the consolidation of the institutional rhythms it has 
traditionally depended on, or through the emergence of new formulas that 
lighten this dependence. 
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